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(EVIDENCE CODE SECTIONS 9&0.962]

A. Statutory Authority

1. Evidence Code section 950 (Lawyer
Defined) states:

As used in this article, "lawyer"
means a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be
authorized, to practice law in any
state or nation.
2. Evidence Code section 951 (Client
Defined) states:
As used in this article, "client"
means a person who, directly or

through an authorized representative, consults a lawyer for the purpose of retaining the lawyer or securing legal service or advice from
him in his professional capacity, and
includes an incompetent (a) who
himself so consults the lawyer or (b)
whose guardian or conservator so
consults the lawyer in behalf of the
incompetent.
3. Evidence Code section 952 (Confidential Communication Between
Client and Lawyer Defined) states:
As used in this article, "confidential
communication between client and
lawyer" means information transmitted between a client and his la wyer in the course of that relationship
and in confidence by a means
which, so far as the client is aware,
discloses the information to no third
persons other than those who are
present to further the interest of the
client in the consultation or those to
whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of
the purpose for which the lawyer is
consulted, and includes a legal opinion formed and the advice given by
the lawyer in the course of that relationship.
4. Evidence Code section 953 (Holder
of Privilege Defined) states:
As used in this article, "holder of the
privilege" means:
(a) The client when he has no
guardian or conservator.
(b) A guardian or conservator of
the client when the client has a
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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guardian or conservator.
(c) The personal representative of
the client if the client is dead.
(d) A successor, assign, trustee in
dissolution, or any similar representative of a firm, association, organization, partnership,
business trust, corporation, or
public entity that is no longer in
existence.

5. Evidence Code section 954 (Who
May Claim Privilege) states:

I

:!

Subject to Section 912 and except as
otherwise provided in this article,
the client, whether or not a party,
has a privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential communication
between client and lawyer if the
privilege is claimed by:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to
claim the privilege by the
holder of the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the lawyer
at the time of the confidential
communication, but such person may not claim the privilege
if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if he [she] is
otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit disclosure. The relationship of attorney and client shall exist between a law corporation as defined in Article 10 (commencing with Section 6160) of Chapter 4 of Division 3 of the Business and Professions Code and
the persons to whom it renders
professional services, as well as
between such persons and
members of the State Bar employed by such corporation to
render services to such persons.
The word ""persons" as used
in this subdivision includes
partnerships, corporations, associations and other groups
and entities.
6. Evidence Code section 955 (When
Lawyer Must Claim Privilege) states:

!
i

I
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The lawyer who received or made a
communication subject to the privilege under this article shall claim the
privilege whenever he is present
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3

when the communication is sought
to be disclosed and is authorized to
claim the privilege under subdivision (c) of Section 954.
7. Evidence Code section 956 (Services

of Lawyer Obtained to Aid in Commission of Crime or Fraud) states:
There is no privilege under this article if the services of the lawyer
were sought or obtained to enable or
aid anyone to commit or plan to
commit a crime or a fraud.
8. Evidence Code section 956.5 (Rea-

sonable belief that disclosure of confidential communication is necessary to prevent criminal act resulting
in death or bodily harm; exception to
the privilege) states:
There is no privilege under this article if the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication relating to
representation of a client is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
death or substantial bodily harm.
9. Evidence Code section 957 (Parties
Claiming Under Deceased Client)
states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue between parties all of
whom claim through a deceased client, regardless of whether the claims
are by testate or intestate succession
or by inter vivos transaction.
10. Evidence Code section 958 (Breach
of Duty Arising Out of Lawyer-Client Relationship in Issue) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue of breach, by the lawyer
or by the client, of a duty arising out
of the lawyer-client relationship.
11.Evidence Code section 959 (Intention or Competence of Client Executing Attested Document in Issue)
states:
There is no privilege under this ar-

ticle as to a communication relevant
to an issue concerning the intention
or competence of a client executing
an attested document of which the
lawyer is an attesting witness, or
concerning the execution or attestation of such a document.
12.Evidence Code section 960 UntenHon of Deceased Client With Respect to Writing Affecting Property
Interest) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue concerning the intention
of a client, now deceased, with respect to a deed of conveyance, will,
or other writing, executed by the client, purporting to affect an interest
in property.
13. Evidence Code section 961 (Validity
of Writing Affecting Interest in
Property Executed by Deceased Client in Issue) states:
There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant
to an issue concerning the validity of
a deed of conveyance, will, or other
writing, executed by a client, now
deceased, purporting to affect an
interest in property.
14. Evidence Code section 962 (Two or
More Clients Retaining Same Lawyer in Matter of Common Interest)
states:
Where two or more dients have retained or consulted a lawyer upon a
matter of common interest, none of
them, nor the successor in interest of
any of them, may claim a privilege
under this article as to a communication made in the course of that relationship when such communication is offered in a civil proceeding
between one of such clients (or his
successor in interest) and another of
such clients (or his successor in interest).
B. AUomey-cllent privilege: Rationale
andacope

The attorney-client privilege constitutes a limitation on the admissibility of
evidence as a means of preserving the
confidentiality of attorney-client com3
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munications. As defined by Evidence
Code Section 954, the privilege authorizes a client to refuse to disclose and to
prevent others from disclosing, information communicated in confidence to and
by an attorney. Confidential communication exists when information is transmitted between the attorney and the client in the course of an attorney client relationship. The communication must be
made in confidence by a means which, in
so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than
those who are present to further the interest of the client in the consultation or
those to whom disclosure is reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the information for the accomplishment of the
purpose for which the lawyer is consulted. Confidential information includes a legal opinion formed and the
advice given by the attorney in the
course of that relationship.
In People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Ca1.3d
682,175 CaI.Rptr. 612, 631 P.2d 46, the
California Supreme Court discussed the
policy and rationale behind the attorney
client privilege and stated:
The fundamental purpose behind the
attorney-client privilege is, of course, to
encourage full and open communication between client and attorney. 'Adequate legal representation in the
ascertainment and enforcement of
rights or the prosecution or defense of
litigation compels a full disclosure of
the facts by the client to his attorney.
Given the privilege, a client may make
such a disclosure without fear that his
attorney may be forced to reveal the information confided to him .... In the
criminal context, as we have recently
observed, these poliCies assume particular significance. As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging
information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the absence
of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it
would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice. Thus, if an accused
is to derive the full benefit of his right to
counsel, he must have the assurance of
confidentiality and privacy of communication. (citations omitted) 29 Cal. 3d at
690-691.
1. Attorney-Client privilege protects

information transmitted between
attorney and client in the course of
the attorney-client relationship.

4

DEFENDER

The attorney-client privilege protects
only confidential communications between client and attorney. The person
who is claiming the privilege has the
burden of proving that an attorney-client
relationship does exist.
Evidence Code Section 951 defines
"client" as a person who directly or
through an authorized representative,
consults an attorney for the purpose of
retaining the attorney or securing legal
advice from the attorney in a professional capacity. The definition includes
an incompetent who consults a lawyer or
whose guardian consults a lawyer on
his/her behalf. Evidence Code Section
950 defines "lawyer' as a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in
any state or nation. An attorney-client
relationship is prima facie established
when a party seeking legal advice consults an attorney and secures ad vice. The
absence of a fee agreement does not prevent the formation of the relationship.
In People v. Canfield, (1974) 12 Cal.3d
699,117 Cal. Rptr. 81, 527 P.2d 633, the
defendant was convicted of auto theft.
While the defendant was in jail, he was
interviewed by a representative from the
public defenders office during which a
financial eligibility statement was taken.
The prosecution introduced this statement at trial to impeach the testimony of
the defendant. The California Supreme
Court held that the financial eligibility
statement was protected under the attorney client privilege, however, the error
did not require reversal. In discussing
the scope of the privilege the court stated:
It is clear from the circumstances under which the statement was given it
was given in confidence (see Evid.
Code Section 952) and that the defendants purpose was to retain the
public defender to represent him in
the criminal proceedings against
him. Under Evidence Code Section
951 and 954 of the Evidence Code,
therefore, any disclosures made by
defendant in the course of the interview were privileged and could not
be revealed without his consent.
The lawyer-client privilege is, indeed, so extensive that where a person seeks the assistance of an attorney with a view to employing him
professionally, any information acquired by the attorney is privileged

whether or not the employment actually results.12 Cal. 3d at 704-705.
In People v. Gardner (1980) 106
Cal.App.3d 882, 165 Cal. Rptr. 415, the
defendant was convicted of first degree
murder. During the trial, the prosecution
introduced a letter written by him to the
public defender which contained an admission of guilt as well as seeking legal
advice. The letter was seized from the
defendant's jail cell. The court of appeal
reversed and held that the letter was protected under the attorney-client privilege
even though the letter had not yet been
sent and no formal attorney-client relationship had been established. The court
held:
It is abundantly clear from the letter

itself and from its context that the
letter was intended for the office of
the local public defender, and that it
was written with the (quite reasonable) expectation that [the defendant] would be represented by that
office. [The defendant] was an indigent criminal accused, who, ... had
been represented by the Monterey
County Public Defender at least
seven times prior to his arrest in this
case. The letter was addressed 'To
P.O.', it concluded by requesting
advice, ad [the defendant] was in
fact represented by the Monterey
County Public defender in this proceeding. 106 Cal. App. 3d at 887.
In Littlefield v. Superior Court (1982)
136 Cal.App.3d 477, 186 Cal. Rptr. 368,
Buono and Bianchi were charged with a
series of murders. Bianchi entered a plea
bargain which included a requirement
that he testify against Buono. During the
trial of Buono, defense counsel sought to
cross-examine Bianchi about conversations which he had with his attorney concerning the plea bargain and to subpoena
all notes and records of those conversations from the public defenders office.
The trial court ordered the witness to testify and for the public defender to produce the requested documents. The
court of appeal issued a peremptory writ
prohibiting the trial court from permitting the cross examination and directing
the trial court to quash the subpoena to
the public defender's office. The court
rejected the argument that the privilege
is "near an end" since the threat of pun2nd & 3rd Quarters, 19'

CALIFO

ishrnent to Bianchi had dissipated. The
court held that these discussions and
notes are protected under the attorney
client privilege:
More significant, unlike the privileges against self-incrimination, the
attorney-client privilege continues
even after the end of threat of punishment. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to preserve
the confidentiality of the information. 136 Cal.App.3d at 482.
The court also held that there the attorney client privilege was not waived
merely because the client testified to facts
that were possibly a topic of conversations with his defense counsel.
In People v. Velasquez (1987) 192
Cal.App.3d 322, 237 Cal.Rptr.366, the
defendant was charged with various
charges including murder and robbery.
At trial, the government called a witness
to testify to conversations that he had
with the defendant in the jail, during
which the defendant allegedly admitted
his participation in the murder. Thewitness was a "jailhouse lawyer" who consulted with the defendant and agreed to
help the defendant file some legal papers
in his case. The defense objected, claiming that these conversations were protected under the attorney-client privilege. The court of appeal held that the
conversations were not privileged because a jailhouse lawyer does not qualify
as an attorney for purposes of the attorney-client privilege:
In enacting section 911 of the Evidence Code the Legislature clearly
intended to abolish common law
privileges and to keep the courts
from creating new nonstatutory
privileges as a matter of judicial
policy. 192 Cal.App.3d at 317.
To come within the privilege, appellant would have had to believe he was
talking to a lawyer. However, appellant
never testified, either at trial or the pretrial hearing on the motion to exclude the
witness (jailhouse lawyer) from testifying, that he believed (the witness) was an
attorney ... While use of "jailhouse lawyers" is not prohibited, it is not encouraged or promoted by state action; nor are
such communications privileged. 192
Cal.App.3d at 327-29.
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3

In People v. Klvana (1992) 11
Cal.App.4th 1679, 15Cal.Rptr.2d 512, the
court of appeal rejected the defendant's
argument of trial counsel failure to invoke the attorney-client privilege:
"The defendant faulls his lrial cuun-

sel for failing to invoke the attorneyclient privilege when an 'attorney'
with whom he had previously consulted was called to the stand. This
assertion is completely meritless
since [the witness] testified that, at
the time of her conversations with
[the defendant], she informed him
that she was no longer licensed and
did not practice law." 11
Cal.App.4th at 1724.
In Hiott v. Superior Court (1993) 16
Cal.App.4th 712, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 157, a
civil case, the plaintiffs brother, an attorney, visited the plaintiff while she was in
the hospital. He initially came as her
brother, but after seeing her condition,
returned later with a video camera and
began asking her questions about the
accident. The court of appeal ruled that
substantial evidence supported the trial
court's inference that the ensuing video
interview constituted attorney-client
communication:
"On January 4, 1990, [plaintiff's]
brother visited her without a video
camera. He was a 'concerned
brother.' On January 6, 1990, her
brother came to the hospital with a
video camera, a fact she would have
noted. When, after only a 'brief salutation,' her brother began asking her
questions (as an attorney gathering
information for potential litigation')
about the circumstances of her slip
and fall-while recording his questions and her answers-it would
have been obvious to her that this
was not 'brother-sister talk' but
rather 'client-lawyer communication.' Her responsive answers evidenced approval and confirmation
of the lawyer-client relationship and
its confidentiality." 16 Cal.App.4th
at 7l8.
2. Attorney-Client privilege protects
only those communications which
are made and intended to be in confidence.

A confidential communication includes a legal opinion formed and ad vice
given by the attorney in the course of the
relationship. A communication need not
be exclUSively verbal, but may include
signs, actions, or the content of papers or
reports given to the client. An observation which is the direct product of a confidential communication may also be
protected.
In Re Navarro (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d
325, 155 Cal. Rptr. 522, an attorney who
represented a defendant in a robbery
case was called to testify at the preliminary hearing of that same defendant in a
murder charge. The attorney was asked
whether she had shown the defendant an
arrest report which may have provided
the motive for the murder. The magistrate found the attorney in contempt and
ordered her to respond finding that the
question was not within the attorney client privilege. The superior court granted
a writ of habeas corpus discharging the
contempt order. The court of appeal affirmed and held:
Nor are we persuaded by the
people's contention that a publication which is in the public domain is
somehow per se nonconfidential.
Once an attorney has determined
that a particular publication is relevant to his inmate-client's case, that
publication may become an integral
part of the attorney's legal ad vice or
strategy and, as such, it would be
entitled to ... protection. 93 Cal. App.
3d at 329.
A lawyers act of handing a police report to his client (if such be the fact) was
a confidential communication privileged
under Evidence Code Section 952. [The
attorney] was duty bound to raise the
privilege on behalf of her client.(Evid.
Code Section 955).93 Cal.App.3d at 330331.
Communications between an attorney and a client who is in jail or in
prison are confidential. In fact, Penal Code 851.5 makes it a misdemeanor for the police to monitor,
eavesdrop on, or record a telephone
call by an arrested person to a retained attorney, the public defender,
or an attorney assigned by the court.
Penal Code Section 636 makes it a
felony for any person to eavesdrop
5
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on or record by electronic device,
without permission from all parties
to the conversation, any portion of a
conversation between any person in
custody or on the property of a law
enforcement agency and his or her
lawy<>r, doctor, or religious advisor.

Penal Code Section 2601(b) provides that a sentence of imprisonment in state prison does not deprive an inmate of the right to correspond confidentially with any
member of the State Bar, provided
only that prison officials may open
and inspect such mail to search for
contraband.
In Barber v. Municipal Court (1979) 24
Ca1.3d 742,760,157 Cal.Rptr. 658, 598
P.2d 818, the California Supreme Court
established that a prisoner has the right
to consult with his or her attorney in absolute privacy even when the interests of
security in the administration of the
prison are considered.
In In re Jordan (1974) 12 Cal.3d 575,
577-578, 116 Cal.Rptr. 371,526 P.2d 523
the court held that an institutional rule
that treated attorney-inmate mail as nonprivileged material was invalid because
it was inconsistent with the rights afforded prisoners under former Penal
Code Section 2600(2) [now see Penal
Code section 2601(b)]. The court also
held that while the authorities were permitted to open mail to search for contraband, they were not permitted to read
the mail to search for "verbal" contraband.
In People v. Meredith (1981) 29 Ca1.3d
682, 175 CaLRptr. 612, 631 P.2d 46, the
defendant was charged with murder and
robbery. A defense investigator, at the
request of defense counsel, had retrieved
the victims' wallet from behind the
defendant's house, brought it to the attorney, who examined it and turned it
over to the police. At trial, the prosecution called the defense investigator to testify as to his observations of the wallet.
All parties agreed that the wallet itself
was properly admitted into evidence
and that any conversations between the
defendant, the investigator and the attorney are confidential. The issue was
whether the investigators' observations,
which were the product of a privileged
communication, are also protected under the attorney-client privilege. The
court held that the attorney-dient privi6
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lege protects not only the initial communications, but extends to information
which the attorney learns or receives as a
result of that communication. However,
the court crafted an exception to the
privilege where the defense has altered
or removed evidence. The court held:
[W]e conclude that an observation
by defense counselor his investigator, which is the product of a privileged communication, may not be
admitted unless the defense, by altering or removing physical evidence has precluded the prosecution from making the same observation. In the present case the defense
investigator, by removing the wallet, frustrated any possibility that
the police might later discover it in
the trash can. The conduct of the
defense thus precluded the prosecution from ascertaining the crucial
fact of the location of the wallet.
Under these circumstances, the
prosecution was entitled to present
evidence to show the location of the
wallet in the trash can. 29 Cal.3d at
686-687.

The court further stated:
We thus view the defense decision
to remove evidence as a tactical
choice. If the defense counsel leaves
the evidence where he discovers it,
his observations derived from the
privileged communications are insulted from revelation. If, however,
counsel chooses to remove evidence
to examine or test it, the original 10cation and condition of that evidence loses the protection of the
privilege. 29 Ca1.3d at 695.
It is not clear whether the California

statute, which renders it a misdemeanor
willfully to conceal evidence with intent
to prevent it from being produced (Penal
Code section 135), requires the attorney
to disclose the information or whether
the attorney's general duty to protect the
client's secrets prevails. The latter is
probably more in keeping with the spirit
of the attorney-client relationship.
In People v. Superior Court (Fairbank)
(1987) 192 Cal.App. 3d 32, 237 Cal. Rptr.
158, the defendant was charged with first
degree murder. The government requested the court to order defense coun-

sel to either physically produce or provide information about the murder
weapons which he learned about from
his client. The trial court would not issue
an order. The government petitioned the
court of appeal for a writ of mandate to
compel the trial court to order production and the court of appeal issued the
writ. The court noted that it was optimistic that defense counsel would satisfy
his/her obligations to the court, but that
the proceedings made clear that the exact
nature of that obligation may not have
been understood.
The court cited two cases as proViding
the parameters by which to asses the
facts in this case. First, People v. Meredith
(1981) 29 Cal. 3d 682, 175 Cal. Rptr. 612,
631 P.2d 46, which established two basic
principles; first, that the attorney-client
privilege is "not strictly limited to communications, but extends to protect observations made as a consequence of protected communications"; and second
that whenever defense counsel removes
or alters evidence the statutory privilege
does not bar disclosure of the original
location and condition of that evidence.
192 Cal.App.3d at 35-36.
The second case was Goldsmith v. Superior Court (1984) 152 Cal. App. 3d 76,
199 Cal. Rptr. 366 where the court upheld
the attorney-client privilege and did not
compel the defense attorney to disclose
the whereabouts of a certain weapon
where the attorney indicated that he
"neither possessed the gun nor had control over it" and there was no indication
that he had ever moved or altered it. 192
Cal. App.3d at 36.
The court reasoned that both of those
cases differ in certain respect but provide
guidance as to what counsel must do:
Defense counsel's obligations are to
the court and their client. Hence,
counsel cannot disclose whether
they have ordo not have the items in
questions. If they do not, then that is
the end of the issue insofar as the
case is concerned. If they are aware
of the location of the items, and have
not taken possession of the them,
then counsel can satisfy their ethica I
obligations to both the court and
their client by leaving the items
where they are in accordance with
the holding of Meridith. [sic] In the
event that defense counsel are in
need of the items sought, they can2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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not secret or destroy the items. 192
CaL App.3d at 37.
In People v. Lee (1970) 3 Cal. App.3d
514,83 Cal. Rptr. 715 the defendant was
convicted of murder. After his arrest, the
ddendant called
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that claim by independent evidence be·
fore disclosure of attorney-client communications can be required.
In People v. Pic'1(1981) 114Cal. App.3d
824,171 CaL Rptr. 106, an attorney and
another man were found guilty of con-

father to tell where

spiracy, extortion and receiving stolen

his bloody shoes were hidden. The father
called the defendant's wife who delivered the shoes to the Public defender's
office who then turned it over to the
Judge. During trial, the government secured possession of the shoes. The court
held that the seizure of the shoes by the
government did not violate any attorney-client privilege. The court further
held that testimony from representatives
of the public defender's office that they
received the shoes from the defendant's
wife and turned them over to the judge
was also not protected. 3 Cal. App.3d at
526-527.

property. During trial, the attorney testified to certain matters and was ordered
by the court to disclose the name of the
client! co-defendant who had telephoned him about making arrangements to return certain stolen property to
the victim. The court held that this information was not to be protected within
the attorney-client privilege:

3. Attorney-dient privilege does not
protect disclosures which are made
in order to gain assistance for a crime
ora fraud.
Evidence Code Section 956 provides
that there is no attorney-client privilege if
the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or a fraud.
Thus, when a client makes a statement
that he or she is about to commit a future
criminal act, that statement is not privileged. However, a prima facie showing
must be made that the clients purpose in
consulting the attorney was to obtain
advice concerning the perpetration of a
crime or fraud before the communication
will be received in evidence over a claim
of privilege. Nowell v. Superior Court
(1963) 223 Cal.App.2d 652,657,36 Cal.
Rptr.21.
This exception is narrower than the
corresponding exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege under Evidence Code Section 1018. Under that exception, the psychotherapist-patient
privilege does not apply if the services of
the psychotherapist are sought or assist
in the planning or commission or a crime
or a tort. Under the exception to the attorney-client privilege, the assistance must
besought fora crime ora fraud, and a tort
is insu fficient.
A party claiming that the services of
an attorney were sought for aid in committing a crime or fraud must establish

The name of the client who consults
a lawyer about a criminal matter
should, normally, be deemed a confidential communication for the
purpose of the lawyer-client privilege .... [The] defendant [attorney]
was also foreclosed from validly asserting the lawyer-client privilege
by virtue of the crime exception to
this privilege, created by Evidence
Code Section 956. As discussed previously, the evidence established
that [the client] had sought the services of defendant Pic'l, an attorney,
to aid in the criminal plan to have
the stolen property ... returned to
[the victim] upon his payment of
$2,500 and the execution of a nonprosecution agreement. 114 CaL
App. 3d at 883-884.
In Nowell v. Superior Court (1963) 223
Cal. App. 2d 652, 657, 36 CaL Rptr. 21, the
appellate court vacated a discovery order requiring a defendant in a libel case
to disclose information concerning a consultation he had with his attorney. The
consultation concerned his contemplated publication of the allegedly libelous material that was the subject of the
action. Holding that the discovery order
could not be justified on the basis that the
defendant had consulted with the attorney for aid in committing a crime or
fraud, the court stated:
The attorney-client privilege does
not extend to communications between the attorney and client "having to do with the client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof .... " [citations
omitted] Similarly, when the client

seeks advice that will serve him in
the contemplated perpetration of a
fraud there is no privilege. [citation
omitted I Real party in interest
makes charges attempting to bring
this case within these exceptions.
But it would be destructive of the
privilege to require disclosure on
the mere assertion of opposing
counsel. "Accordingly, evidence
should be presented to make a
prima facie showing that this was
the client's purpose (to commit a
crime) before the communication is
received (into evidence}." [citation
omitted] 58 American Jurisprudence
says: "The mere charge of illegality
will not defeat the privilege. There
must be prima facie evidence that
the illegality has some foundation in
fact." 223 CaLApp.2d at 657.
In Dickerson v. Superior Court (1982)
135 Cal.App.3d 93, 185 Cal.Rptr. 97, an
attorney petitioned the court of appeal
for a writ to set aside an order by the superior court directing him to answer
questions at a deposition. Dickerson
claimed that the order violates the attorney client privilege. The court of appeal
granted the writ without prejudice for
the superior court to review whether the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client applies pursuant to Evidence Code
Section 956. With respect to whether this
exception would apply the court observed:
Had the issue been brought before
respondent court, it is possible that
an exception might have been found
in the enactment nullifying the
privilege "if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan
to commit a crime or fraud." The
communications between Chandler
and Dickerson were allegedly made
in furtherance of a fraud. However,
a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to make the exception applicable. Thus, had a prima facie showing of fraudulent purpose been
made, the discovery order would
have been proper. 135Cal.App.3d at
100.
In People v. Clark (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 583,
268 CaLRptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, the California Supreme Court held that although
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a psychotherapist-patient privilege did
not apply when the psychotherapist disclosed a threat made by the defendant
during therapy sessions, the attorney-client privilege applied to render the disclosure inadmissible at trial. The court ob-

closure of the communication is necessary
to prevent the threatened danger. In
People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583,268
Cal.Rptr. 399,789 P.2d 127, at the request
of defense counsel, a psychotherapist was
appointed to examine the defendant. In

served that since the psychotherapist

conversations with that psychotherapist,

had been appointed to assist defense
counsel the attorney-client privilege
which therefore arose was not waived by
the psychotherapist's disclosure. In discussing the attorney-client privilege,
however, the Clark court explained the
parameters of the crime! fraud exception
to the attorney-client privilege:

the defendant threatened to kill two
people. The psychotherapist consulted
with her attorney and arranged for her
attorney to inform the potential victims of
the threats, thus revealing the communication. The California Supreme Court
held that the threats were no longer confidential under the psychotherapist-patient
privilege:

The attorney-client privilege does
not encompass communications between attorney and client that are intended to further future criminal
conduct.
Cases decided since adoption of the
Evidence Code recognize the limited nature of the exception to the attorney-client privilege created by Evidence Code
section 95.6: "This exception is invoked
only when a client seeks or obtains legal
assistance 'to enable or aid' one to commit a crime or fraud. The quoted language clearly requires an intention on the
part of the client to abuse the attorneyclient relationship... "50 Cal.3d 583,622623.

4. Attorney-client privilege does not
protect disclosures which the attorney believes are necessary to prevent
the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
In 1993, Evidence Code section 956.5
was added to create an exception to the
attorney-client privilege when the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of
the confidential communication relating
to representation of the client is necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm.
A comparable provision is that of Evidence Code section 1024, which creates an
exception to the psychotherapist-patient
privilege if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe that the patient is
dangerous to another person and that dis8

D

Defendant contends that the statements were confidential, and because they were made ina confidential relationship prior to the time
[the psychotherapist] told him she
might have to reveal them, he had
not waived the confidential nature
ofthe communication. We need not
decide the waiver question to resolve this claim, however, because
at the time of the trial [the psychotherapist] had already revealed the
communications that were, therefore, no longer confidentiaL
A psychotherapist has a profesSional
duty to maintain the confidential character of communications made to him by
his patient during the course of the relationship, but when it is necessary to disclose confidential information to avert
danger to others the therapist must do so.
The purpose underlying Evidence Code
section 1014 is not to prevent the use of a
defendant's statement against him in legal proceedings. It exists to prevent the
unnecessary disclosure of statements
made in confidence in the course of a
privileged communication with a therapist and thereby to facilitate treatment. If
the statements have been revealed to
third persons in a communication that is
not itself privileged, however, they are
no longer confidentiaL
The question is not whether the psychotherapist-patient privilege has been
waived or the exception that would permit compelled disclosure in a legal proceeding applies, but whether the privilege may be claimed at all once the communication is no longer confidential.
Whether the psychotherapist 'reasonably believes' (Evid.Code sec. 1024) that

D

E

R

revelation of the communication is necessary also becomes irrelevant once the
communication has lost its confidential
status. The reason for the privilege-protecting the patient's right to privacy
and promoting the therapeutic relationship-and thus the privilege itself, disappear once the communication is no
longer confidential. 50 Cal. 3d at 619-620.
The Court, however, found that because the psychotherapist had been appointed to assist the defense attorney, the
communication was still privileged by
the attorney-client privilege:
The attorney-client privilege serves a
different purpose. It exists to permit
a client to freely and frankly reveal
confidential information, including
past criminal conduct, to the attorney
or others whose purpose is to assist
the attorney, and to thereby enable
the attorney to adequately represent
the client. In a criminal case the privilege also serves to preserve the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination that might otherwise be
deemed to have been waived by his
revelation of incriminating information. To make adequate representation possible, therefore, these privileges assure criminal defendants that
confidential statements to their attorney will not be adrnissible in any proceeding.
The Legislature has recognized this
distinction on purpose in Evidence Code
section 1024, where it provides that there
is no [psychotherapist-patient privilege]
if the therapist believes it is necessary to
disclose the communication. No similar
provision reflects an intent that the attorney-client privilege terminate if a communication to an attorney is made public
without a waiver of confidentiality by
the client. Since defendant's statements
to [the psychotherapist] were also communications made in the attorney-client
relationship, unless defendant waived
the privilege or did not intend that the
statements be confidential, they continued to be privileged notwithstanding the
fact that they were no longer confidential
at the time of triaL 50 CaL3d at 620-21.
The 1993 addition of Evidence Code
section 956.5 appears to have partially
abrogated the latter language in Clark, by
providing a statute reflecting an intent
that the attorney-client privilege termi2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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nate if the attorney believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent the death or
bodily injury to another person. Thus, it
now appears that Clark's ruling with regard to the loss of confidentiality from a
psychotherapist's disclosure of communication may apply with equal force to a

comparable disclosure, under comparable circumstances, by an attorney of a
defendant's threat to kill or harm another
person.
However, Clark may have survived
insofar as it held that when a psychotherapist reveals a threat made by the
defendant during therapy sessions, the
psychotherapist-patient privilege is no
longer applicable but the attorney-client
privilege remains applicable.lt may now
be that, under these circumstances when
both privileges are at play, both the psychotherapist and the attorney would
have to disclose the threat, or arguably at
least both reasonably believe that disclosure is necessary to prevent death or
bodily harm, for its confidentiality as to
both privileges to be lost. (See
F.2.b.:A.B.A. Model Rule 1.6, and F.3.,
below)
5. Attorney·client privilege does not
protect disclosures relevant to an issue of breach.
No privilege protects a confidential
communication between an attorney and
client when the communication is relevant to an issue of breach, by either the
attorney or the client, of a duty arising
out of the attorney-client relationship.
(E vidence Code section 958)(See Glade v.
Superior Court (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 738,
746-7, 143 Cal.Rptr.119) Thus, when a
criminal defendant fled and claimed after he was apprehended that his attorney
had counseled his flight, the attorney-client privilege did not prevent disclosure
by the attorney at a hearing on the
defendant's motion for a new trial of the
defendant's statements to the attorney
relevant to his disappearance. People v.
Vargas (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 516,525-528,
126 Cal.Rptr. 88. In a habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a criminal
defendant's claim of incompetence of
counsel, the attorney-client privilege between the defendant and the challenged
attorney is waived concerning those
matters put in issue by the defendant.
Inad equa te representa tion of counselis a
charge of a breach of duty arising out of
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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the attorney-client relationship; thus, the
privilege does not apply in this context.
6. Attorney-client privilege does not
protect disclosures which are made
to third persons unless these disclosures are made to persons to further
the interest of the client or to accomplish the purpose for which the attorney was consulted.
Under Evidence Code section 952, to
be a confidential communication between attorney and client, the communication must not be disclosed to a third
person other than one who is present to
further the interest of the client in the
communication or to whom disclosure is
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the
lawyer is consulted.
The Law Revision Commission Comment to Evidence Code Section 952 states
in pertinent part:
Confidential communications also
include those made to third parties-such as the lawyer's secretary,
a physician, or similar expert-for
the purpose of transmitting such
information to the lawyer because
they are "reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the information ... "
A lawyer at times may desire to have
a client reveal information to an expert
consultant in order that the lawyer may
adequately advise his client. The inclusion of the words "or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the lawyer
is consulted" assures that these communications, too, are within the scope of the
privilege. This part of the definition may
change existing law...
The words "other than those who are
present to further the interest of the client
in the consultation" indicate that a communication to a lawyer is nonetheless
confidential even though it is made in the
presence of another person-such as a
spouse, parent, business associate or
joint client-who is present to further the
interest of the client in the consultation.
These words refer too, to another person
and his attorney who may meet with the
client and his attorney in regard to a
matter of joint concern.
In Barber v. Municipal Court, etc., the

defendant sought a writ of prohibition to
dismiss the criminal charges. The defendants alleged that their Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated
by the presence of a government agent in
an undercover capacity at their confidential attorney-client meetings. TheCalifornia Supreme Court granted the writ and
held:
The right to counsel, which embodies the right to private consultation
with counsel, is violated when a
state agent [in an undercover capacity1is present at confidential attorney-client conferences ...The fact that
the petitioners discussed their defenses with joint counsel in a conference type setting rather than in a
one-on-one session does not diminish their right of confidentiality. 24
CaL 3d at 752, 754.
In People v. Lines, (1975) 13 C.3d 500,
119 Cal. Rptr225,531 P.2d 793, thedefendant was charged with the murder of his
aunt. He entered pleas of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity. After a
bifurcated trial, the defendant was found
both guilty and sane. The defendant
claims that it was error for the court to
admit, over objection, the testimony of
two court-appointed psychiatrists in violation of his attorney-client privilege. The
two doctors were initially appointed by
the court under Evidence Code Section
1017. The California Supreme Court held
that, pursuant to an appointment under
Evidence Code Section 1017, any communication between the defendant and
the doctors was protected under the attorney-client privilege:
Where, as here, pursuant to section
1017 of the Evidence Code, a psychotherapist is appointed by the court in
a criminal proceeding to examine the
defendant in order to provide the
defendant's attorney with information for the purposes set forth in said
section, the results of such examination, including any report thereof,
and all infornlation and communications relating thereto, are protected
from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege notwithstanding the fact
that the defendant has theretofore or
thereafter tendered in said proceeding the issue of his mental or emotional condition. 13 Ca1.3d at 514.
9
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The court, however, found that the
error was not suffidently prejudidal to
the defendant to warrant reversal. Two
other doctors testified at the trial who
were appointed pursuant to Penal Code
Section 1027 which requires the court to
appoint two psychiatrists to examine the
defendant after he/~he ha~ rah;ed a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.
These psychiatrists may be called by either party or by the court. Any statements made by the defendant to the doctors appointed under Penal Code section
1027 are not privileged under the attorney-client privilege. Since the testimony
which was admitted by the doctors appointed pursuant to Penal Code section
1027 was essentially the same as that
from the doctors appointed pursuant to
Evidence Code section 1017, the Court
found no prejudice. The Court, however,
did disapprove the practice of appointing the same doctor under the two Evidence Code sections. Since the communications given under the first appointment are privileged, and those under the
second appointment are not, it may impose an impossible task for the doctor to
compartmentalize the information and
not rely upon or use any information that
is deemed privileged.
An expert loses his or her status as a
consulting agent of the attorney if the
attorney calls the expert to the witness
stand. Once the witness is called, neither
the attorney-client privilege nor the
work-product doctrine apply to matters
relied on or considered in the formation
of his or her opinion. People v. Milner
(1988) 45 Ca1.3d 227, 241, 246 Cal.Rptr.
713,753 P.2d 669.
In People v. Haskett (1990) 52 CaL3d
210,276 Cal.Rptr. 80,801 P.2d 323, the
California Supreme Court rejected a
claim that calling a psychotherapist to
the stand at a first trial did not waive the
attorney-client privilege:

In the trial court, defendant invoked
only the psychotherapist-patient
privilege ... The privilege was
waived, however, when defendant
called [the psychotherapist] to testify on his behalf at the first triaL On
appeal, defendant invokes for the
first time the attorney-client privilege on the mistaken assumption
that it has survived the waiver ofthe
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
People v. Clark (1990) 50 Ca1.3d 583,
10

D

E

discussing the differences between
the psychotherapist-patient privilege and the attorney-client privilege, agreed that statements made to
a psychotherapist may be made in
the attorney-client relationship and,
"unless defendant waived the privilege or did not intend that the statements be confidential, they continued to be privileged notwithstanding the fact that they were no longer
confidential at the time of tria!." The
defendant's statements in Clark
were revealed to potential victims
and were thus no longer confidential at the time of trial, but in Clark,
the defendant had at no time
waived the privilege.
As the People argue, here defendant
did waive the privilege when [the psychotherapist] was called to the stand by
the defense in the first trial. 52 Ca1.3d at
242-43.
A disclosure may be made for a limited purpose under certain circumstances, thereby not waiving the attorney-client privilege. In People v. Aguilar
(1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1556,267 Cal.Rptr.
879, a psychological expert was appointed to aid the defense. Pursuant to
the requirements of Evidence Code section 795, the defendant underwent hypnosis in the psychological sessions. The
defendant later sought to testify at trial,
requiring a hearing on the admissibility
of his posthypnosis testimony. For these
purposes only, the defendant agreed that
the prosecutor could review videotapes
of the hypnosis sessions. The trial court
ruled that the statements made in the
videotapes could be used by the prosecutor as impeachment evidence at trial. The
court of appeal held that the ruling was
error, but that the error was not prejudicial requiring reversal:
The defendant's waiver of the [attorney-client] privilege against disclosure of his interviews with the hypnotist was occasioned by the trial
court's erroneous application ofEvidence Code section 795 to his testimony. The waiver was not only limited to the hearing on admiSSibility
of his posthypnosis testimony, it
was also freely and voluntaril y
made. However, ... the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. 218 Cal.App.3d at 1565-66.

7. Assertion of the Privilege: The client
or his or her attorney may claim the
privilege and in certain instances the
attorney must claim the privilege.
Subject to Evidence Code Section 912,
which governs waiver of privileges by
disclosure, the client, whether or not a
party to a particular action has a privilege
to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential
communication between the client and
his or her attorney.
The attorney who received or made a
confidential communication must claim
the privilege whenever he or she is
present when the communication is
sought to be disclosed. Thus, while the
attorney client privilege belongs only to
the client, the attorney is professionally
obligated to claim it on the client's behalf
whenever the opportunity arises unless
the client has instructed otherwise.

c. Waiver of the AttomeyoCllent privilege
1. The attorney-client privilege may

only be waived by the client's
uncoerced disclosure of all, or a substantial part, of a privileged communication, or by a failure to claim the
privilege when the client has the legal standing and opportunity to assert the claim.
Evidence Code Section 912 provides
that a waiver of the attorney-client privilege may be found "if any holder of the
privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone". Waiver depends
upon actual, and not potential disclosure
of confidential communications. Failure
to object to evidence may constitute a
waiver of the priVilege.
In Maas v. Municipal Court (1985) 175
Cal.App.3d 601, 221 Cal. Rptr. 245, the
defendant was charged with murder by
complaint. A witness in the case entered
into a plea bargain with the government
in which she agreed to testify against the
defendant. The attorneys for the defendant issued subpoenas to the lawyers for
this witness asking them to produce
documents concerning their client arguing that she had waived any attorney-client privilege by entering into the plea
agreement. The magistrate ordered the
lawyers to produce the documents and
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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the Superior Court issued a writ ordering
the magistrate to vacate his order. The
court of appeal affirmed the writ holding
that when the witness entered into a
written plea agreement and was granted
immunity, she had not waived her attorney client privilege. The court held:
[Tjhe waiver of a privilege must be a
voluntary and knowing act, done
with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, ... While a -qritten immunity agreement might include an
unambiguous waiver of the attorney-client privilege among its
temls, clearly the agreement at issue
in this case did not. 175 CaL App.3d
at 603.
In People v. Tamborrino, (1989) 215 CaL
App. 3d 575, 263 CaL Rptr. 731, the court
held that a witness did not waive the attorney-client privilege by testifying to
the same facts he related to his attorney.
In this robbery prosecution, the defendant testified the victim was accusing
him of the robbery to get even with him
for selling her fake narcotics. At the conclusion of his testimony the trial judge
asked the defendant, ""Did you tell your
lawyer about the story you just related
on the stand 7" Defense counsel objected
that the answer would violate the
defendant's attorney-client privilege.
The trial judge overruled the objection
but the appellate court held the question
was improper. The court stated:
Defendant' 5 testimony concerning
facts that might have been previously related by him to his counsel is
not equivalent to disclosure by him
of the actual content of an attorneyclient communication, and does not
constitute a waiver of the privilege.
He testified only to fads supporting
his defense ... he did not testify concerning, nor did any of his testimony relate to any communication
he might have had with his counseL
263 CaLRptr. at 734.
In People v. Poulin (1972) 27
CaLApp.3d 54, 103 CaL Rptr. 623, the
defendant was convicted of explosion of
a destructive device. During trial, while
the victim was describing the bomb
which injured him, the bailiff saw the
defendant gesture to his attorney and say

!
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"It was not quite like that". The government called the bailiff as a witness and
the defendant made no objection to the
testimony as privileged. On appeal the
court found no error and stated:
[Tlhe fdilure tu ubject tu its ddmi5sion

or to claim the privilege resulted in a
waiver thereof(Evid. Code Section
912).27 CaLApp.3d at 64.
2. Attorney-client privilege is waived
as to matters put is issue on any
question of breach of a duty arising
out of the lawyer-client relationship.
Evidence Code Section 958 provides
that there is no privilege as to a communication relevant to an issue of breach, by
the lawyer or by the client, of a duty arising out of the lawyer-client relationship.
The Law Revision Commission comment to Evidence Code Section 958
states:
It would be unjust to permit a client
either to accuse his attorney of a
breach of duty and to invoke the
privilege to prevent the attorney
from bringing forth evidence in defense of the charge or to refuse to
pay his attorney's fee and invoke the
privilege to defeat the attorney's
claim. Thus, for example, if the defendant in a criminal action claims
that his lawyer did not provide him
with an adequate defense, communications between the lawyer and
client relevant to that issue are not
privileged.

In re Dudley Gray (1981) 123
CaLApp.3d 614, 176 CaLRptr. 72, an attorney was held in contempt for refusing
to answer questions at a habeas proceeding brought by a former client who was
alleging ineffective assistance of counseL
The court on appeal denied the applicationfora writ of habeas corpus and held:
We hold that there is no attorney-client privilege as to matters put in issue in a habeas corpus proceeding
where the competency of
defendant's trial attorney is at
issue ... [However], we are limiting
our holding to matters put in issu~
by the petition. Therefore, the petitioner is not going to get bushwhacked. The privilege is waived

only as to issues raised in the petition he or she elects to file ... Of
course, if during an evidentiary
hearing a defendant discovers that
he has opened a real can of worms
and that some of the goodies he has
imparted to his attorney may come
to light, he can protect himself by
simply dismissing the petition. 123
Cal.App.3d at 616-17.
D. Laying Foundation to Establish
Existence of Attorney.client Privilege

Disputes over the disclosure of information, or the production of material
that may be subject to the attorney-client
privilege can arise during trial. To make
a prima facie showing that the attorneyclient privilege is applicable, the party
asserting the privilege has the burden of
proof for the foundational requisites.
Thus, the party claiming the privilege
must establish that (1) the person to
whom the client made the communication in dispute was a lawyer authorized
to practice law in some state or nation (or
someone the client reasonably assumed
to be authorized to practice law); (2) the
client consulted the lawyer to obtain legal service or advice; and (3) the specific
communication in dispute was made in
the course of that attorney-client relationship [see Evid. Code §§ 950,952; see
also Travelers Ins. Companies v. Superior
Court (1983) 143 Cal. App. 3d 436,447448,191 Cal. Rptr. 871. ,In contrast, the
proponent of the evidence has the burden of proving that the privilege does not
apply because the communication was
not made in confidence, was waived, or
falls under an exception [see above1Sometimes, an adequate foundation will
already have been laid by previous testimony or, as in a case where a questions
calls for communicaJ;ions with a party's
attorney of record, matters that may be
judicially noticed; if not, the foundation
must be established through the examination of a witness.
In many cases, the requisite showing
may be made by simply asking the attorney or client whether an attorney-client
relationship existed. Collette v. Sarrasin
(1920) 184 CaL 283,289,193 P. 571. In
other cases, it may be necessary to establish the subject matter of a particular attorney-client relationship and when it
came into existence. When a communication was transmitted by or to a third
person, the party claiming the privilege
11
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ibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial.
(e) Any exculpatory evidence.
(0 Relevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor

ployee transmitting report wa& acting as

intends to call at the trial, including any

attorneys, law enforcement agencies

corporate spokesperson).
A party asserting a claim of attorneyclient privilege does not waive the privilege by disclosing the existence or subject
matter of an attorney-client relationship,
the dates on which attorney-client communications occurred, or even the general subject matter of the communications. Mitchell v. Superior Court (1984) 37
Cal. 3d 591, 601,603, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886,
691 P,2d 642; see also Coy v, Superior
Court (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 210, 219, 220, 23
Cal Rptr, 393,373 P.2d 457. However, a
disclosure of any significant part of the
content of the communication may result
in a waiver. fulrik Productions, Inc. v.
Chester (1974) 38 Cal. App. 3d 807, 811,
113 Cal. Rptr. 527.

reports or statements of experts made in
conjunction with the case, including the
results of physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or
comparisons which the prosecutor intends to offer in evidence at the trial.

which investigated or prepared the case
against the defendant, or any other persons or agencies which the prosecuting
attorney or investigating agency may
have employed to assist them in performing their duties.
(b) Before a party may seek court enforcement of any of the disclosures required by this chapter, the party shall
make an informal request of opposing
counsel for the desired materials and information. If within 15 days the opposing counsel fails to provide the materials
and information requested, the party
may seek a court order. Upon a showing
that a party has not complied with Section 1054.1 or 1054.3 and upon a shmving
that the moving party complied with the
informal discovery procedure provided
in this subdivision, a court may make
any order necessary to enforce the provisions of this chapter, including, but not
limited to, immediate disclosure, contempt proceedings, delaying or prohibiting the testimony of a witness or the presentation of real evidence, continuance of
the matter, or any other lawful order.
Further, the court may advise the jury of
any failure or refusal to disclose and of
any untimely disclosure.
(c) The court may prohibit the testimony of a witness pursuant to subdivision (b) only if all other sanctions have
been exhausted. The court shall not dismiss a charge pursuant to subdivision (b)
unless required to do so by theConstitution of the United States.

Penal Code section 1054.2. Disclosure
of address or telephone number of
victim or witness; prohibition;
exception
No attorney may disclose or permit to
be disclosed to a defendant the address
or telephone number of a victim or witness whose name is disclosed to the attorney pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 1054.1 unless specifically permitted
to do so by the court after a hearing and
a showing of good cause.

E. Reciprocal Discovery and the Effects

or Proposition 115 on the Attomey·
Client Privilege

1. Statutory Authority

Proposition 115, passed in June, 1990,
amended the California Constitution by
permitting reciprocal discovery in criminal cases. Furthermore, Proposition 115
added Chapter 10 to the California Penal
Code. This Chapter (listed below) enumerates the specific items of evidence
that the prosecution and defense must
make available upon request.
Penal Code section 1054.1. Prosecuting
attorney; disclosure of materials to the
defendant
The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to the defendant or his or her attorney all of the following materials and
information, if it is in the possession of
the prosecuting attorney or if the prosecuting attorney knows it to be in the
possession of the investigating agencies:
(a) The names and addresses of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses at triaL
(b) Statements of all defendants.
(c) All relevant real evidence seized or
obtained as a part of the investigation of
the offenses charged,
(d) The existence of a felony conviction of any material witness whose cred12

(a) No order requiring discovery shall
be made in criminal cases except as provided in this chapter. This chapter shall
be the only means by which the defendant may compel the disclosure or production of information from prosecuting

may also be required to show that the
third person was acting in a particular
capacity. D.I. Chadbourne, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1964) 60 Cal. 2d 723, 736,739, 36
Cal. Rptr. 468, 388 F.2d 700 (existence of
privilege dependent upon whether em-

Penal Code section 1054.3. Defense
counsel; disclosure of information to
prosecution
The defendant and his or her attorney
shall disclose to the prosecuting attorney:
(a) The names and addresses of persons, other than the defendant, he or she
intends to call as witnesses at trial, together with any relevant written or recorded statements of those persons, or
reports of the experts made in connection
with the case, and including the results of
physical or mental examinations, scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons
which the defendant intends to offer in
evidence at the trial.
(b) Any real evidence which the defendant intends to offer in evidence at the
trial.
Penal Code section 1054.4.
Nontestimonial evidence
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as limiting any law enforcement
or prosecuting agency from obtaining
non testimonial evidence to the extent
permitted by law on the effective date of
this section.
Penal Code section 1054.5. Criminal
cases; discovery orders; informal
request; testimony of witnesses;
prohibition

Penal Code section 1054.6. Work
product privilege
Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose
any materials or information which are
work product as defined in subdivision
(c) of Section 2018 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, or which are privileged pursuant to an express statutory provision,
or are privileged as provided by the Constitution of the United States.
'*NOTE: This section and its relation
to work product are dealt with more extensively below.
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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Penal Code section 1054.7. Disclosure
of information; time limitations
The disclosures required under this
chapter shall be made at least 30 days
prior to the tria\' unless good cause is
shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted or deferred. If the mate-

The Izazaga court rejected the defense

rial and information becomes known to,
or comes into the possession of, a party
within 30 days of trial, disclosure shall be
made immediately, unless good cause is
shown why a disclosure should be denied, restricted or deferred. "Good
cause" is limited to threats or possible
danger to the safety of a victim or witness, possible loss or destruction of evidence, or possible compromise of other
investigations by law enforcement.
Upon the request of any party, the
court may permit a showing of good
cause for the denial or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of that showing,
to be made in camera. A verbatim
records shall be made of any such proceeding. If the court enters an order
granting relief following a showing in
camera, the entire record of the showing
shall be sealed and preserved in the
records of the court, and shall be made
available to an appellate court in the
event of an appeal or writ. In its discretion, the trial court may after trial and
conviction, unseal any previously sealed
matter.

challenge that the discovery provision
violates the 6th Amendment right to
counsel by chilling the defense counsel's
preparation:
... Under the new discovery chapter,
a criminal defendant need disclose
only those witnesses (and their
statements) the defendant intends
to call a t trial. It is logical to assume
that only those witnesses defense
counsel deems helpful to the defense will appear on a defendant's
witness list. The identity of damaging witnesses that the defense does
not intend to call at trial need not be
disclosed. 54 CaL3d at 379.

2. Validity
In lzazaga v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the above sections, holding that Penal Code section 1054 et seq.,
does not compel a criminal defendant to
be a witness against oneself in violation
of the Fifth Amendmentto the Constitution. In this case the defendant was
charged with rape and kidnapping. The
prosecutor moved for discovery of the
defense witnesses and the trial court
granted the motion. The defense filed a
writ of mandate or Prohibition that the
court of appeals summarily denied. The
California Supreme Court upheld the
denial of the writ by the court of appeals
and concluded that the discovery provisions of Proposition 115 are valid under
the state and federal constitutions. The
Court further held that Penal Code section 1054 et seq. affords defendants sufficient rights of reciprocal discovery to
meet the requirements of the 14th
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Amendment Due Process Clause as it
provides that the defendant will have the
opportunity to discover the prosecutor's
rebuttal witnesses (and their statements)
following discovery of defense witnesses
by the prosecutor.

3. Scope of disclosure

Hobbs v. Municipal Court (1991) 233
Cal.App.3d 670, 284 CaLRptr. 655, decided the same year as [zazaga, also upheld the constitutionality of the discovery provisions of Proposition 115.
Hobbs, charged in a felony complaint
with residential burglary, had his charge
reduced to a misdemeanor at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing. He attacked the constitutionality of the discovery provisions of Proposition 115, and
also argued that the discovery provisions
of Proposition 115violatethework product doctrine. In striking down these arguments, as well as the one the Proposition 115 should not apply in misdemeanor cases, the court stated:
The language of Proposition 115 makes
no distinction between felony and misdl....
meanor cases. Rather, it repeatedly refers
to the "criminal justice system," and
"criminal cases". The Penal Code includes
misdemeanors as well as felonies in its
definitions of crimes... We also find significant the fact that in the are of discovery,
PropOSition 115 repealed both the misdemeanor statute and part of the felony statute that required discovery of police reports. Thus, where there were specific
discovery statutes concerning felonies and
misdemeanors, the initiative dealt with
both categories of crime. We conclude this
is strong evidence of legislative intent to
include misdemeanors as well as felonies

within the discovery provisions of the
measure. 233 Cal.App.3d at 696.
Rodriguez v. Superior Court (1993) 14
CaLApp.4th 1260, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 120,
held that, in a prosecution for rape, robbery, burglary, and first degree murder,
defend.mt's statement to a psychologist,
made at his counsel' 5 behest for purposes
of evaluation in preparation of the defense case, came within Evidence Code
section 952, a privileged communication
under the attorney-client privilege. The
court further held that under Penal Code
section 1054.6, information within the
statutory attorney-client privilege is not
subject to disclosure at the time a witness
is designated pursuant to Penal Code
section 1054.3:
We conclude that the privilege provision of section 1054.6 is meant to
modify and affect the blanket disclosure provisions of section 1054.3.
Accordingly, we interpret section
1054.3 as requiring disclosure of information when the witness is designated unless that information is
privileged by "express statutory
provision" or otherwise protected
as work product. Such an interpretation construes each statutory provision (1054.3 and 1054.6) in light of
the other, is an harmonious interpretation, is reciprocal in effect, and
does not render section 1054.6 a nullity. 14 Cal.App.4th at 1269.
Therefore, even though the psychologist was designated as a defense witness,
the defense did not have to disclose prior
to trial the psychologist's report of
defendant's remarks concerning the
charged offenses. The court also held
that the partial disclosure to the prosecution before trial of defendant's psychological report did not waive the attorneyclient privilege with respect to a deleted
section of the report. [This section contained defendant's remarks to the psychologist concerning the charged offenses.] The court reasoned that since the
disclosure was done pursuant to a court
order and was not voluntary, the waiver
of the privilege as to one aspect of a protected relationship does not necessarily
waive the privilege as to other aspects of
the privileged relationship. The court
cited the defense's good faith efforts to
comply with the court's order and cooperate with the prosecutor without waiv13
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ing any privilege regarding defendant's
statements about the alleged offense.
Citing the Rodriguez opinion, the
court in Sandeffer v. Superior Court (1993)
18 CaLApp.4th 672, 22 CaLRptr.2d 261,
held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction under Penal Code section 1054.5,

subd. (b) (court may make any order necessary to enforce discovery provisions),
by directing defense counsel to disclose
the identity of the expert and produce the
expert's documents despite defense
counsel's representations that he had not
yet made a decision as to whether to call
the expert as a witness at triaL The determination of whether to call a witness, the
court held, is peculiarly within the discretion of counsel, and even when counsel appears to be unreasonably delaying
the publication of the decision to call a
witness, it is not within the province of
the trial judge to step into counsel's
shoes. The court further held that an order requiring an expert witness in a
criminal case to produce his or her
"notes" in most instances goes beyond
the specification of discoverable items set
forth in Penal Code section 1054,
subd.(e). This section provides that discovery of information pertaining to expert witnesses shall include any reports
or statements of the expert made in connection with the case, as well as the results of physical or mental examination,
scientific tests, experiments, or comparisons which the defendant intends to offer
in evidence at triaL
In Peopie v. Superior Court (Sturm)
(1992) 9 CaLApp.4th 172, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d
652, the court held that Penal Code section 1054.3, subd.(a) [requiring the defense to disclose to the prosecution the
witnesses it intends to call "at trial,"1 includes those witnesses the defense intends to call during the penalty phase of
a capital triaL The court held that Penal
Code section 190.3, [which requires exclusion of aggravating evidence proffered by the prosecution in the penalty
phase of a homicide prosecution unless
the defense has been given notice of itl,
does not control penalty phase discovery
procedures so as to preempt the reciprocal discovery provisions of Penal code
section 1054 et seq. The court further
held that to interpret the reciprocal discovery provisions to require the disclosure of defense witnesses to be called in
the penalty phase does not violate the
due process rights of capital defendants
14

I

DEFENDER

or deny them equal protection.
Regarding the juvenile court context,
the court in Robert S. v. Superior Court of
Sonoma County (1992) 9 CaLAppAth
1417,12 Cal.Rptr.2d 489, held that reciprocal discovery provisions applicable in
criminal procE'pdings did not apply in
juvenile delinquency proceedings, but
that the juvenile court had discretionary
authority to enter reciprocal discovery
order.
In the more recent case of People v.
Sanchez (1994) W.L. 157932 (CaLApp. 2
Dist.), the court held that once some incriminating writings had been delivered
to the trial court, the trial court could
furnish those writings to the prosecutor
without violating either the defendant's
privilege against self-incrimination or
the reciprocal discovery statutes (Penal
Code sections 1054-1054.7). In this case,
the Public Defender representing
Sanchez, who was charged with murder,
was given some inculpatory writings
done by the defendant. The writings
were not given to the lawyer by the defendant, but by a third party. The Public
Defender placed the writings in a sealed
envelope, and without informing the
prosecutor, delivered them to the clerk of
the court. (Although counsel never did
explain why he turned these papers over
to the court, the court surmised that he
may have felt some professional obligation to do so). The court specifically did
not hold that counsel had a duty to tum
over such writings, but limited its holdings to the actions of the court once the
writings were disclosed.
F. Ethical Considerations Regarding
Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Confidentiality of Information

1. Statutory Authority

All persons licensed to practice law in
California are bound by the statutes comprising the State Bar Act (Business and
Professions Code sections 6000-6228)
and the Rules of Professional Conduct
(Rules 1-100 - 5-320). An attorney who
willfully breaches any of the Rules of
Professional Conduct can be disciplined
by public or private reproval, or by suspension from practice (Bus. & Prof. Code
sec. 6077). Similarly, an attorney can be
disbarred or suspended for any of the
following:
(1) Willful disobedience or violation of a court order which the

attorney ought in good faith to
obey;
(2) Violation of the oath taken by
the attorney to defend the
Const. and the la ws of the state
and nation; or
(3) Violation of the duties of an
attorney.(Bus. & Prof. Code sec.
6103)

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
THE STATE BAR OF CAUFORNIA

Rule 1-100 - Rules of protosslonal
Conduct, in General.

(A) Purpose and Function
The following rules are intended to
regulate professional conduct of members of the State Bar through discipline.
They have been adopted by the Board of
governors of the State Bar of California
and approved by the Supreme Court of
California pursuant to Business and Professions code sections 6076 and 6077 to
protect the public and to promote respect
and confidence in the legal profession.
These rules together with any standards
adopted by the Board of Governors pursuant to these rules shall be binding upon
all members of the State Bar.
For a willful breach of any of these
rules, the Board of Governors has the
power to discipline members as provided by law.
The prohibition of certain conduct in
these rules is not exclusive. Members are
also bound by applicable law induding
the State Bar Act. (bus. & Prof. Code, section 6000 et seq.) and opinions of California Courts. Although not binding, opinions of ethics committees in California
should be consulted by members for
guidance on proper professional conduct. Ethics opinions and rules and standards promulgated by other jurisdictions and bar associations may also be
considered.
These rules are not intended to create
new civil causes of action. Nothing in
these rules shall be deemed to create,
augment, diminish, or eliminate any substantive legal duty of lavvyers or the nondisciplinary consequences of violating
such a duty.
(B) Definitions.
(1) "Law Firm" means:

(a) two or more lawyers whose activities constitute the practice of
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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law, and who share its profits,
expenses, and liabilities; or
(b)a law corporation which employees more than one lawyer;
or
(d a division, department, office,

Hons who are not members:
These rules shall also govern the
activities of lawyers while engaged in the performance of lawyer functions in this state; but
nothing contained in these rules

or group within a business en-

shall be deemed to authorize the

tity, which includes more than
one lawyer who performs legal
services for the business entity;
or
(d)a publicly funded entity which
employs more than one lawyer
to perform legal services.
(2) "Member" means a member of the
State Bar of California.
(3) "Lawyer" means a member of the
State Bar of California or a person
who is admitted in good standing
of and eligible to practice before
the bar of any U.S. court or the
highest court of the District of Columbia or any state, territory, or
insular possession of the United
States, or is licensed to practice law
in, or is admitted in good standing
and eligible to practice before the
bar of the highest court of, a foreign country or any political subdivision thereof.
(4) Associate" means an employee
or fellow employee who is employed as a lawyer.
(5) "Shareholder" means a shareholder in a professional corporation pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6160 et seq.

performance of such functions by
such persons in this state except as
otherwise permitted by law.

U

(C) Purpose of Discussions.
Because it is a practical impossibility
to convey in black letter form all of the
nuances of these disciplinary rules, the
comments contained in the Discussions
of the rules, while they do not add independent basis for imposing discipline,
are intended to provide guidance for interpreting the rules and practicing in
compliance with them.
(D) Geographic Scope of Rules.
(1) As to members:
These rules shall govern the activities of members in and outside this
state, except as members lawfully
practicing outside this state may
be specifically required by a jurisdiction in which they are practicing to follow rules of professional
conduct different from these rules.
(2) As to lav..)'ers from other jurisdicVolume 6, \lumber 2 & 3
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(E) These rules may be cited and
referred to as "Rules of Professional
Conduct of the State Bar of California.

tion of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause
with which he or she is charged.

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest.
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself or herself, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed.
(i)

Rule 1-110. Disciplinary Authority of the

SiateBar.

A member shall comply with conditions attached to public or private
reprovals or other discipline administered by the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6077
and 6078 and rule 956, California Rules of
Court.
Business and Professions Code
section 6068. Duties of attorney.
It is the duty of an attorney to do all of
the following:
(a) To support the Constitution and
laws of the United States and of
this state.
(b) To maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers.
(c) To counselor maintain such actions, proceedings, or defenses
only as appear to him or her legal
or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense.
(d)To employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to
him or her such means only as are
consistent with truth, and never to
seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law.
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself
or herself to preserve the secrets, of
his or her client.
(f)

To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor or reputa-

To cooperate and participate in
any diSciplinary investigation or
other regulatory or diSciplinary
proceeding pending against the attorney. However, this subdivision
shall not be construed to deprive
an attorney of any privilege guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United
States or any other constitutional
or statutory privileges.

(j) To comply with the requirements
of Section 6002.1. (Official membership records; maintenance of
information; service of notice initiating proceedings; availability of
information on records; form for
reports)
(k)To comply with all conditions attached to any disciplinary probation, including a probation imposed with the concurrence of the
attorney.
(I)

To keep all agreements made in
lieu of disciplinary prosecution
with the agency charged with attorney discipline.

(m) To respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and
to keep clients reasonable informed of significant developments in matters with regard to
which the attorney has agreed to
provide legal services.
The attorney also has a duty to provide copies to the client of certain documents under time limits and as prescribed by the Rules of Professional Conduct (Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068(n».
Under specified conditions, such as the
bringing of an indictment charging a
15
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felony against the attorney, the attorney
must make written reports to the State
Bar (Bus. & Prof. Code section 6068(0».
2. Professional Relationship with
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People v. Pic'/ (1982) 31 Ca1.3d 731, 183
Cal.Rptr. 685).
A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT

Clients
a. Scope of Representation

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Rule 3-110: Failing to Act Competently

(A) A member shall not intentionally,
recklessly, or repeatedly fail to
perform legal services with competence.

For purposes of this rule, "competence" in any legal service shall mean
to apply to the 1) diligence, 2) learning
and skill, and 3) mental, emotional,
and physical ability reasonably
necessary for the performance of such
service.

(B)

(C) If a member does not have
sufficient learning and skill when the
legal service is undertaken, the
member may nonetheless perform
such services competently by 1)
associating with or, where appropriate, professionally consulting another
lawyer reasonably believed to be
competent, or 2) by acquiring sufficient learning and skill before
performance is required.

Rule 3-210: Advising the Violation of Law

A member shall not advise the violation of any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal unless the member believes in good
faith that such law, rule, or ruling is invalid. A member may take appropriate
steps in good faith to test the validity of
any law, rule, or ruling of a tribunal.
Rule 3-210 is intended to apply not
only to the prospective conduct of a client but also to the interaction between
the member and client and to the specific
legal service sought by the client from the
member. An example of the former is the
handling of phYSical evidence of a crime
in the possession of the client and offered
to the member. (See People v. Meredith
(1981) 29 Cal.3d 682, 175 CaLRptr. 612).
An example of the latter is a request that
the member negotiate the return of stolen
property in exchange for the owner's
agreement not to report the theft to the
police or prosecutorial authorities. (See
16

Rule :1..2 Seope of Repre_ntatlon

(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation, subject to
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and
shall consult with the client as to
the means by which they are to be
pursued. A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a
maUer. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client decision, after consultation with the
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and
whether the client will testify.
(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by
appointment, does not constitute
an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral
views or activities.
(c) A lawyer may limit the objectives
of the representation if the client
consents after consultation.
(d) A la'WY~r shall not counsel a c1i~I}t
to engage: or assist a client. in conduct that thgJawyer knows is
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawy~LIl}(ly discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of
conduct with a!;!ient and may
counselor assist a client to make a
good faith ~ffort to determine the
validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.
(e) When a lawyer knows that a client
expects assistance not permitted
by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the lawyer shall
consult with the client rC'garding
the relevant limitations on the
lawyer's conduct.
COMPARISON· A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Disciplinary Rule 7-102: Repf9lll8ntlng a
Client Within the Bounds of the Law
(A) In his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not:

(1) File a suit, assert a position, conduct a

defense, delay a trial, or take other
action on behalf of his client when he

knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass
or maliciously injure another.
(2) KnOWingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law. except that he may advance
such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law.
(3) Conceal or knowingly

fail to disclose
that which he is required by law to
reveal.

(4) Knowingly use perjured testimony or

false evidence.
(5) KnOWingly make a false statement of
law or fact.
(6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when he knows or
it is obvious that the evidence is false.
(7) Counselor assist his client in conduct

that the la'WYer knows to be illegal or
fraud ulent.
(8) Knowingly engage in other illegal
~onduct or coI\<:llJd contrary to a DisCiplinary Rule.
(B) A lawyer who receives Infonnation
clearly establishing that:

(1 ) Hisc::lient has, in the course of the rep:

resentation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly
call upon his client to rectify the same,
iln if his client refuses OIis unable t9
go so, he shall reveal the fraud to the
ilffected person or tribunaL except
when the information is protected as
a privileged <;Qmmunication.
(2) a person other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall
promptly reveal the fraud to the tribunal.
*NOTE:Qisct.p.linary Power: The
Model Code makes no attempt to prescribe either the disciplinary procedures
or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define
standards for civil liability of lawyers for
professional conduct. The Model Code
seeks only to specify conduct for which a
lawyer should be disciplined by courts
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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offered material evidence and
comes to know of its falsity, the
la wyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.

and governmental agencies which have
adopted it.
b. Confidentiality of Information
See Business and Professions Code
section 6068(e).
A.B.A. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
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(blThe duties stated in paragraph (a)
continup to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

Rule 1.6 Conftdentlallty of Information

(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client
unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are
impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:

(c) A la wyer may refuse to offer evidence
that the lawyer reasonably believes is
false.
(d)In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer
shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which
will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the
facts are adverse.
A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY

(1) to prevent the client from commit-

ting a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on
behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or a civil claim
against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of
the client.

(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under appHcable law, and
"secret" refers to other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or
would be likely to be detrimental to
the client.

(B) Except when permitted under DR
4-101(0, a lawyer shall not know-

Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal

ingly:

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:

Reveal a confidence or secret of his
client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his
client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his
client for the advantage of himself
or of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the
consent of the client or clients affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or
required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information

(1) make a false statement of material

fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a
tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal
or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal

authOrity in the controlling juriSdiction known to the lawyer to be
directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false. If a lawyer has
Volume 6, Number 2 & 3
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Disciplinary Rule 4-101 Preservation of
Confidences and Secrets of a Client

(1)

necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary
to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees
or associations against an accusation of wrongful conduct.
(D) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable
care to prevent his employees,
associates, and others whose services
are utilized by him from disclosing or
using confidences or secrets of a
client, except that a lawyer may reveal
information allowed by DR 4-101 (C)
through an employee.
The California Rules of Professional
Conduct, based in part on the old A.B.A.
Model Code, are unaffected by the new
A.B.A. Model Rules, and there are no
current plans for adoption of the Model
Rules in this state. It is likely, however,
that California courts and lawyers will
find the Model Rules both helpful and
persuasive in situations where the coverage of the California Rules of Professional Conduct is unclear or inadequate.
The Comment to the A.B.A. Model
Rule 1.6 states that a lawyer may foresee
that the client intends serious harm to
another, but if disclosure is required or
permitted the client will be inhibited
from revealing facts which would enable
the lawyer to counsel against wrongful
action. If further goes on to advise that
where practical, the lawyer should seek
to persuade the client to take suitable
action; and in any case disclosure should
be no greater than the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary.
The Comment also distinguishes several situations: (1) A lawyer may not
counselor assist in conduct that is criminal or fraudulent, or use false evidence;
(2) A lawyer innocently involved in past
criminal or fraudulent conduct has not
violated Rule 1.2(d) (above); i.e., "counsel or assist" requires knowledge of the
criminal or fraudulent character; (3) A
lawyer who learns that a client intends
prospective criminal conduct likely to
result in imminent death or substantial
bodily harm has discretion to reveal the
information when he reasonably believes that this purpose will be carried
out.
3. Client's Intention to Commit a Future
Crime

Any communication made by the defendant to his or her attorney of an inten17
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tion to commit a crime is not privileged
under California law. (Evidence Code
section 956.5) Under the American Bar
Association's Professional Responsibility Code and Model Rules, such a communication may and perhaps should be
rpvpa1pd hy the attorney, as wpll as any

information necessary to prevent the
crime. (See AB.A. Model rules ofProfessional Conduct, Rules 1.6(b)(1) [above],
3.3(a)(2); A.B.A. Code of Professional
Responsibility, DR 4-101(C)(3) [above])
Thus, the California Supreme Court has
approved of a defense attorney s request
to speak to the trial judge in camera, and
informing the judge that the defendant
may attempt to escape and that it might
be wise to order the defendant handcuffed during the trial. (People v. Cox
(1991) 53 Cal. 3d 618,651-52, 280Cal.Rptr.
692,809 P.2d 351lattorney' s revealing of
rumor, although permitted and perhaps
obligated, was insufficient to constitute
manifest need, thus shackling and handcuffing should not have been ordered
without a greater showing])
Nothing in the California Codes
places an affirmative duty upon the attorney to reveal his client's intention to
commit a crime. (See B.4., above)

II. AnORNEY'S WORK PRODUCT
PROTECTION

A. StatutOlY Authority

1. Penal Code section 1054.6 provides:
Neither the defendant nor the prosecuting attorney is required to disclose any materials or information
which are work product as defined in
subsection (c) of Section 2018 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, or which are
privileged pursuant to an express
statutory provision, or are privileged
as provided by the Constitution of the
United States.

2. California Code of Civil Procedure
section 2018 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) It is the policy of the state to: (1)
preserve the rights of attorneys to
prepare cases for trial with tha t degree of privacy necessary to encourage them to prepare their
cases thoroughly and to investigate not only the favorable but the
unfavorable aspects of those cases;
and (2) to prevent attorneys from
18
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taking undue advantage of their
adversary's industry and efforts.
(c) Any writing tha t reflects an
attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research
or theories shall not be discoverable under any circumstances.
B. Work Product Protection-General

A claim of work product operates like
a privilege to prevent disclosure of particular information. Under most circumstances, it protects the private work of an
attorney from discovery. It is defined in
the Cal. Code Civil Procedure, section
2018(c) as any writing that reflects an
attorney's impressions, conclusions,
opinions, legal research or theories.
However, without any more guidance as
to the meaning of "work product" material, a determination must be made by
the court on a case by case basis as to
whether a writing falls within its protection.
The United States Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor, (1947) 329 U.s. 495, 91
L.ed. 451, 67 S. Ct. 385, stated:
Proper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant
from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.
That is the historical and the necessary
way in which lawyers act within the
framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect
their client's interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
intangible ways- aptly though roughly
termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
in this case as the 'work product of the
lawyer. 329 U.5. at 511.
In California, courts have identified
attorney work product "as material
which is derivative in character, not ultimate facts but material compiled by the
attorney in preparation of his or her
case". In re Jeanette H. (1990) 225 Cal.
App.3d 25, 32, 275 Cal. Rptr. 9.
C. Adoption of Work Product Rule In
California

California was slow to adopt the principles of the work product rule. In an
early case, the California Supreme Court
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held that the work product rule was not
applicable in California. Greyhound Corp.
v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355,
401,15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266. Greyhound was a personal injury suit arising
from a collision with a bus. Plaintiffs'
counsel was unable to locate witnesses to
the accident despite diligent efforts and
sought an order requiring defendant to
disclose the written statements of witnesses collected at the scene by defendant's investigators. In upholding the
trial court's discovery order, the California Supreme Court held that the work
product privilege was not applicable in
California and refused to apply the
Hickman work product rule, stating:
This is not to say that discovery may
not be denied, in proper cases, when disclosure of the attorney's efforts, opinions,
conclusions or theories would be against
public policy ... or would be eminently
unfair or unjust, or would impose an
undue burden.
Even though the doctrine was never
officially recognized, between the Greyhound decision in 1961 and the adoption
of the Civil Discovery Act in 1963, the
work product rule became de facto law
in California. In court cases, the concept
of work product was recognized, not as
an absolute bar to discovery, but as one
circumstance to be considered by a court
in exercising its discretion to determine
whether or not discovery was fair and
equitable under the circumstances.
D. PROPOSmON 115

The work product rule was held to
apply to criminal cases even before the
passage of Proposition 115 codified the
protection in the Penal Code. In People v.
Collie, (1981) 30 Cal. 3d 43, 177 Cal. Rptr.
458, 634 P.2d 534, the defendant was
charged with attempted first degree
murder of his wife and attempted second
degree murder of his child. During triat
a defense witness testified that she had
spoken with a defense investigator prior
to trial. The prosecution moved for discovery of the notes prepared by the investigator. Over the defense objection on
the basis of the work-product doctrine
and attorney-client privilege, the court
ordered production of those notes and
the defendant was convicted. The California Supreme Court reversed the conviction on other grounds, but found that
the trial court violated the work product
privilege in granting the prosecution's
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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discovery motion. This error was found
to be harmless. The court discussed the
applicability of the work product doctrine as follows:
We have never explicitly held the
work product doctrine applicable to
criminal cases and neither has the
Legislature, although it has codified
the rule as to civil trials. (Code Civ.
Pro. section 2016(b». There is little
reason, however, to withhold its
protection from the criminally accused. As the United States Supreme Court held in
"Although the work product doctrine
most frequently is asserted as a bar
to discovery in civil litigation, its
role in assuring proper functioning
of the criminal justice system is even
more vital. The interests of society
and the accused in obtaining a fair
and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand
that adequate safeguards assure the
thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case."
30 Cal.3d at 59.
Proposition 115 passed by the voters
in California in June of 1990 created a
new" reciprocal discovery" provision for
criminal cases by the addition of sections
1054 - 1054.7 to the Penal Code. Penal
Code section 1054.6 explicitly provides
for the application of the work product
doctrine to criminal discovery. This provision states that neither the defendant
nor the prosecution can be reqUired to
disclose any material or information that
is work product as defined in Code Civ.
Pro. section 2018(c). This included any
writings that reflect an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
research or theories is provided absolute
protection. The work product doctrine
for criminal cases, therefore, does not
include the conditional protection afforded civil litigants under Code Civil
Pro section 2018(b) that protects any
product of an attorney unless the protection will result in an injustice.
Penal Code section 1054.6 does not
appear to change the law with respect to
the absolute protection of the work product privilege, but only to codify existing
law. Therefore, counsel should be able to
rely upon earlier precedents in determining the scope and meaning of the doctrine. In addition, since the Penal Code
Volume 6, Number ~ & 3

specifically cites to the definition of work
product in the Code of Civil Procedure,
counsel should examine and cite to the
vast body of cases in the civil context that
have attempted to define the meaning of
"work product".
However, counsel must examine the
earlier cases carefully to determine the
basis for the court finding that material is
protected as "work product". If the court
found the writing to fall within the"absolute" work product protection under
Code Civ. Procedure 2018(c), (absolute
protection for impressions, opinions,
etc), then this finding would be relevant
to a determination in the criminal context. However, if the court found a writing to be conditionally protected under
Code Civ. Procedure 2018(b), (qualified
protection which must be disclosed to
avoid injustice), than this material would
not be protected under the criminal code.
E. The Constitutionality of the Discovery and Work Prodnct doctrine
Proposition 115 created a new "reciprocal discovery" system in criminal prosecutions in California. Penal Code section 1054 1054.7. Prior to this provision,
the work product doctrine had little application in criminal prosecutions since
the prosecution had few rights to discovery of defense materiaL However, with
the passage of Proposition 115, the work
product doctrine will be an important
means by which each party will attempt
to resist disclosure of material.
In Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54
Cal. 3d 356,285 Cal. Rptr. 231, 815 P.2d
304, the California Supreme Court found
these discovery provisions to be constitutional. In this case the defendant was
charged with rape and kidnapping. The
prosecutor moved for discovery of the
defense witnesses and the trial court
granted the motion. The defense filed a
writ of mandate or prohibition that the
court of appeals summarily denied. The
California Supreme Court upheld the
denial by the court of appeals and concluded that the discovery provisions of
proposition 115 are valid under the state
and federal constitutions. The court rejected the defense challenge that the discovery provision violates the sixth
amendment right to counsel provision as
enunciated in Hickman v. Taylor (1947)
329 U.s. 495. The court reasoned:
The doctrine developed in Hickman
and applied in the context of discov-
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ery in criminal cases in Nobles,
supra, 422 U.s. 225, is not based on
the right to counsel clause; rather it
is a form of federally created privilege based upon federal supervisory
policy and federal statute. (Citations
omitted). There is no privilege for
attorney work product in the California Constitution. Because the
work product doctrine is not constitutionally founded, there is no basis
for a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the new discovery chapter on work product grounds.
Moreover, we note the new discovery
chapter expressly provides that attorney
work product is nondiscoverable. Because there is no constitutional basis for
a work product privilege, any protection
in California of the work product of an
attorney must be based on state common
or statutory law. 54 Cal. 3d at 381.
F. Attomey.cllent Privilege and Work

Product distinguished

California Evidence Code sections
950-962 govern the privilege between
lawyer and client. It preserves the confidentiality of communications between
the lawyer and the client with the purpose of encouraging full disclosure and
open communications within this relationship.
This privilege should be distinguished from an attorney's work-product rule which protects the "work-product" of the attorney from discovery by
opposing counsel. This protection is
governed by the Code of Civil Procedure
section 2018. Under this section any writing that reflects an attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal research or theories is not discoverable
under any circumstances. Other matters
that may constitute an attorney's work
product may be discoverable if the court
deems that denial of the discovery will
(1) unfairly prejudice the party seeking
discovery or (2) result in an injustice.
Code Civ. Proc. Section 2018(b).
In many situations the attorney-client
privilege and the work product rule
overlap, as for instance, when an investigator for the attorney obtains information from the client and transmits a report to the attorney. The two are, however, separate and distinct and differ in
several important respect: (1) statutory
basis, (2) purposes, and (3) holders.
19
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In BP Alaska Exploration, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 199 Cal. App. 3d 1240,
1256,245 Cal. Rptr. 682, quoting United
States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co. (D.C.
Cir. 1980) 642 F.2d 1285, 1299, the court
contrasted the purposes of the attorney-
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that a witness list is not protected under
the work product doctrine. The court of
appeals upheld this ruling and discussed
the scope of the work product doctrine in
criminal cases stating:

client privilege and the work product

[T]c the extent that witnesses' state-

rule [ef. Admiral Ins. v. U.S. Dist. Court For
Dist. Of Ariz. (9thCir. 1989)881 F.2d 1486,
1494J:

ments and reports of witness interviews reflect merely what the witness said they are not work product
As the high court said in Nobles 422
U.s. at p. 238, 'At its core, the work
product doctrine shields the mental
processesoftheattorney, providing
a privileged area within which he
can analyze and prepare his client's
case. (citations omitted) To the extent that a report of a witness interview reflects an attorney's mental
processes, it is exempted from discovery by section 1054.6 and a party
can seek a protective order to that
effect. (see Code Civ. Proc. section
2031(e) or an in camera review in
which the privileged material can be
excised. 233 Cal. App.3d at 693.

The attorney-client privilege exists
to protect confidential communications, to assure the client that any
statements [the client} makes in
seeking legal advice will be kept
strictly confidential between [the client and the client's] attorney; in effect, to protect the attorney-client
relationship. By contrast, the work
product privilege does not exist to
protect a confidential relationship,
but rather to promote the ad versary
system by safeguarding the fruits of
an attorney's trial preparations from
the discovery attempts of the opponent. The purpose ofthe work product doctrine is to protect information against opposing parties, rather
than against all others outside a particular confidential relationship, in
order to encourage effective trial
preparation.
The attorney-client privilege belongs
to the client and only the client can waive
the privilege. In contrast, the work product protection belongs to the attorney,
not the client, although a client may be
able to assert the work product rule in the
attorney's absence. Lasky, Haas, Cohler &
Munter v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.
App. 3d 264, 218 Cal. Rptr. 205; Kerns
Constr. Co. v. Superior Court (1968) 266
Cal. App. 2d 405, 411, 72 Cal. Rptr. 74.
G. Work Product protection applies to an
attorney's ilnPressions, conclusions,
opinions, legal research or theories.

Hobbs v. San Diego Mun. Court (People)
(1991) 233 Cal. App.3d 670, 284 Cal. Rptr.
655, involved a misdemeanor prosecution for burglary. The prosecutor filed a
notice and motion for discovery of a complete list of defense witnesses. The trial
court granted the motion and the defense
filed a writ of mandate Superior court.
The court denied the writ and held that
Penal Code section 1054.3 was constitutional as applied to misdemeanors and
20
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The court then contrasted the application of the work product doctrine in
criminal and civil cases and observed
that in the criminal context, the Initiative
limited its scope to provide only an absolute privilege to those writings that reflect "an attorney's impressions, opinions, or legal research, or theories". The
provision did not embrace the broader,
qualified work product privilege set
forth in the Code of eiv. Pro. 2018(c).
In Rumac Inc. v. Bottomly (1983) 143
Cal. App.3d 810, 192 Cal. Rptr. 104, plaintiff landowners subpoenaed certain
documents that were prepared and in the
possession of the attorney who had represented the defendant landowners during negotiations. The trial court granted
the defendant's motion for a protective
order finding that these documents were
absolutely protected from discovery as
they represented the attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, etc. The
court also found that the privilege applies even where the lawyer is not preparing for trial but acting only as a consultant or a negotiator. The court held:
Neither the text of the statute nor the
policy underlying the creation of the absolute privilege warrants a class distinction between the la ..;yer-negotiator and
the lawyer-litigator. There is also no
valid reason to differentiate between the

writing reflecting the private thought
processes of a lawyer acting on behalf of
a client at the beginning of a business
deal and the thoughts of a lawyer when
that business deal goes sour with resultant litigation. 143 Cal. App.3d at 812.
The COllrt went on to reason:
In light of the legislative effort devoted to the statute, it is reasonable
to believe that had the Legislature
intended to limit the privilege to litigation only it would have said so.
The Legislature not only failed to
provide for any such limitation but
in section 3 declared its intent that
the courts were not to be constrained in their interpretation of the
attorney's absolute work product
privilege. 143 CaL App.3d at 815.
In Fellows v. Superior Court (1980) 108
Cal. App. 3d 55, 68, 166 Cal. Rptr.274, the
defendants in an insurance bad faith case
sought to discover the entire legal file of
the attorney who represented the plaintiffs in the underlying action. Holding
the material in the file to be absolutely
protected from discovery, the court
stated:
The language of [the statute] is clear
and explicit. It offers no opportunity for compromise or variation,
There is no authorization for the
court to weigh or balance any competing interests between the party
seeking disclosure and the party resisting disclosure. Invocation ofthe
attorney's work product privilege
with respect to such a document
precludes discovery since such a
document "is protected absolutely
from disclosure by the attorney's
work product privilege .. .." [emphasis in original; citation omitted}
In Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. (1978) 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 646, 648,
151 Cal. Rptr. 399, the court of appeal
held that the work product rule precluded the introduction at trial of the
portion of the notes of an investigator
employed by a codefendant's attorney
that reflect the investigator's ,..fYrr>rn"·nt"
about a witness's statements. The
tigator interviewed a witness and
corded the witness's statements tOj.:;etller
with the investigator'S comments
those statements. The witness
2nd & 3rd Quarters, 1994
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quently left the jurisdiction, and the
witness's deposition was read at triaL
Another codefendant called the investi~
gator as a witness and cross-examined
the investigator on the contents of the
notes. The appellate court held that the
portion~ of the lIotes thal recorded the
witness's statements are nonderivative
or noninterpretative in nature, and thus
are not protected by the work product
rule. The portions of the notes that constitute the investigator's comments
about the witness' statements are absolutely protected from disclosure as a
writing that reflects an attorney's (or
attorney's agent's) impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal research, or legal
theories. The appellate court held that
comments of the attorney's investigator,
which are protected under the attorneyclient privilege, were so intertwined with
the witness's recorded statements, which
are unprotected under the attorney-client privilege, that all the notes on the
matter should be protected by the absolute portion of the attorney's work product privilege.
H. Protection for Opinion Work Product
Applies Onl, to Writings

The term "writing," as used in Code
of Civil Procedure section 2018(c), is defined in Evidence Code section 250. The
term has been broadly defined to include
most forms of tangible expression, see,
e.g., People v. Estrada,(1979) 93 Cal. App.
3d 76, 100, 155 Cal. Rptr. 731 (tape recordings); People v. Moran, (] 974) 39 Cal. App.
3d 398, 408,410, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, (phonograph records).
Unlike the federal rule which protects
an attorney's mental impressions (Fed.
Rules Civ. Proc., rule 26(b)(3»,
California's absolute protection for opinion work product applies, on its face,
only to writings that reflect the attorney's
opinion. In practice, this limitation may
not be significant. A legal opinion, including the attorney's impressions and
conclusions, formed during the course of
an attorney-dient relationship is privileged under Evidence Code section 952,
regardless of whether or not the opinion
has been communicated to the client.
Lohman v. Superior Court,(1978) 81 CaL
App. 3d 90, 99, 146 Cal. Rptr. 171, but see
Merritt v. Superior Court,(1970) 9 Cal.
App. 3d 721, 731, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337 (court
allowed discovery of materials that appear to constitute opinion work product
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on ground that it was not in writing, and
held that the attorney-client privilege
had been waived).
I. Statements of witnesses are not
protected as work product

Under the nc"" Penal Code sections

1054 -1054.7 (passed as Proposition 115)
the new reciprocal discovery provisions
are set forth. These sections specifically
provide for the discovery of statements
of witnesses that one side intends to call
at trial Since section 1054.6 states thatthe
work product of counsel is protected, it is
clear that the legislation did not intend to
include witness statements to fall within
the work product protection. However,
in a response to a discovery request from
the prosecution, the defense could always raise a constitutional objection to
the disclosure of any material including
statements of witnesses.
Counsel should review earlier cases
where the defense made discovery requests and faced government objections
to disclosure based upon "work-product" doctrine.
In People v. Williams (1979) 93 CaL
App.3d 40, 155 Cal. Rptr.414, thedefendant was convicted of forcible rape and
aiding and abetting a rape. Prior to trial,
the defendant made a discovery motion
requesting notes of the prosecutors interview with the victim. The trial court denied the request finding that these notes
were work product. The court of appeals
reversed finding that the trial court erred
in admitting the trial testimony of the
victim from an earlier trial. The court also
found that it was error for the trial court
to deny the defendant's discovery request. The court stated:
It is well settled that there is no
attorney's work product privilege
for statements of witnesses since
such statements constitute material
of a non-derivative or non-interpretive nature. (citations omitted). 93
Cal. App.3d at 64-65.

In People v. Alexander (1983) 140 Cal.
App.3d647, 189 Cal. Rptr. 906, thedefendant was convicted, inter alia, with conspiracy to commit murder in an incident
arising out of a prison riot. The defense
requested discovery of notes made by
correctional officer and the prosecutors
as a result of their interviews with inmates. The defense claims that these are

discoverable as they constitute "material
of a nonderivative or noninterpretive
nature". 140 CaL 3d at 660. The trial court
denied this request and the court of appeal upheld the order finding:
The prosecuting attorney's discussions with inmates appear to have
been trial preparation rather than investigative sessions .... [Dlenial of
access to these notes did not prejudice the defense's trial preparation.
140 Cal. App.3d at 660, 661.

In People v. Alexander (1982), supra, the
court applied the work product protection as defined in the Code of Civil procedure section 2018. It appears that the
court did not find the material was absolutely protected under 2018(C), but rather
that its disclosure could not be compelled under 2018(b). Under the new
Penal Code section 1054.6, work product
is protected only if it falls within the absolute protection as defined in Code Civ.
Pro.2018(c). It is therefore not clear how
the court will handle this type of request
in the future.
J. Work Product Protection Extends to
Work of Agents of the Attome,

In People v. Collie (I 981) 30 Cal. 3d 43,
177 Cal. Rptr. 458,634 P.2d 534, the defendant was charged with attempted
first degree murder of his wife and attempted second degree murder of his
child. During trial, a defense witness testified that she had spoken with a defense
investigator prior to trial. The prosecution moved for discovery of the notes
prepared by the investigator. Over the
defense objection on the basis of the work
product doctrine and attorney-client
privilege, the court ordered production
of those notes and the defendant was
convicted. The Ca lifornia Supreme
Court reversed the conviction based on
the issue of an improper jury instruction
on the issue of intent for second degree
murder. However, the court did find that
the trial court violated the work product
privilege in granting the prosecution's
discovery motion although this error
was found to be harmless. In discussing
the application of the work product doctrine to criminal cases, the court quoted
United States v. Nobles, 422 U. S. 225, and
stated:
[T]he [work product I privilege
should extend not just to the attorneys
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work product, but to the efforts of those
who work with him to prepare the defense: 'At its core, the work product doctrine shelters the mental processes of the
attorney, providing a privileged area
within which he can analyze and prepare
his client's case. Hut the doctrine is an
intensely practical one, grounded in the
realities of litigation in our adversary
system. One of those realities is that attorneys must often rely on the assistance
of investigators and other agents in the
compilation of materials for trial. It is
therefore necessary that the doctrine protect material prepared by agents for the
attorney as well as those prepared by the
attorney himself'. 30 Cal. 3d at 59.
In People v. Milner (1988) 45 CaL 3d
243, 246 Cal. Rptr. 713, the defendant was
convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. At trial, at the request of
the prosecutor, defense counsel voluntarily turned over transcripts of three interviews conducted with the defendant
by Dr. Solomon. Dr. Solomon was called
as a defense witness at trial. On appeal,
the defense alleges that trial counsel was
ineffective in turning over material that
he was under no obligation to disclose;
specifically that these transcripts were
protected under the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. The
court of appeals disagreed finding that
Dr. Solomon was not an agent of the attorney. The court held:
Section 721, subdivision (a) of the
Evidence Code provides that an expert witness 'may be fully cross examined as to ... (3) the matter upon
which his opinion is based and the
reasons for his opinion," Once the
defendant calls an expert to the
stand, the expert loses his status as
consulting agent of the attorney,
and neither the attorney client privilege nor the work product doctrine
applied to matters relied on or considered in the formation of his opinion. 45 Cal. 3d at 722.
In Grand Jury v. Superior Court
(Harrison) (1989) 259 Cal. Rptr. 404
(Ca1.App. 4 Dist), the grand jury was investigating the death of Harrison's exwife. During these proceedings,
Harrison was referred to as the prime
suspect. He was represented by an attorney who retained an investigator,
Braxton. Braxton was subpoenaed to the
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grand jury and asked to identify a witness to events immediately preceding
the murder. Braxton refused to answer
and the court ruled that this information
was protected under the attorney-client
privilege. On appeal the defense alleges
that the governrnenl may not exlract in-

formation from an accused or one of
his\her agents based upon attorney-client privilege, confidential communications between attorney and client, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and
a defendant's right to counsel. The court
of appeals concluded that under the circumstances of the case, neither the attorney nor his investigator can be required
by the grand jury to give testimony concerning the investigation. The court held:
We hold, however, that the Sixth
Amendment right of representation of
counsel, unimpeded by interference of
the prosecution, together with the privilege against self-incrimination, preclude
the questioning sought by the district attorney in this case. A criminal
investigator's work product relating to a
criminal investigation is privilege and
once it has been established that the investigator was retained by legal counsel
hired to represent a suspect, the investigator cannot be forced to reveal the product of his investigation. 259 Cal. Rptr. at
413.
K. Work Product privilege may be waived

In United States v. Nobles, (1975) 422
U.S. 225, the defendant was convicted in
Federal court on charges arising from an
armed robbery of a bank. In preparing
for trial, a defense investigator interviewed the two government witnesses
and prepared reports reflecting these
conversations. These reports were used
during cross examination of these witnesses. During the defense case, the investigator was called to testify about
these conversations and complete the
impeachment of the witnesses. When
the defense refused to disclose these
written reports to the prosecutor, the trial
court would not allow the investigator to
testify. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit Court erred. The Court held that
while the work product doctrine applies
to criminal litigation, its protection was
unavailable in this case. The court stated:
We need not, however, undertake here to delineate the scope of

the [work product] doctrine at trial,
for in this instance it is clear that the
defense waived such right as may
have existed to invoke its protection.
The privilege derived from the work
product doctrine is not absolute. Like
other qualified privileges, it may be
waived. Here, [the defendant] sought to
adduce the testimony of the investigator
and contrast his recollection of the contested statements with that of the
prosecution's witnesses. [Defendant], by
electing to present the investigator as a
witness, waived the privilege with respect to matters covered in his testimony.
[Defendant] can no more advance the
work -product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work product
materials than he could elect to testify in
his own behalf and thereafter assert his
Fifth Amendment privilege to resist
cross examination on matters reasonably
related to those brought out in direct examination. 422 U.S. at 2'39-240.
In People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal. 3d
713,244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741, the
defendant was convicted of first degree
murder, burglary and robbery and was
sentenced to death. At trial, the defense
investigator testified about information
he learned from a government witness
about who had committed the killing. On
cross examination, the prosecutor questioned the investigator about what was
done upon learning this information.
The defense objected and argued that
questions concerning investigatory efforts violated the attorney work -product
privilege. The court allowed some inquiry into action not taken by the investigator and sustained the other defense
objections. On appeal, the defense renews their objection on work product
grounds. The court upheld the conviction and found that to the extent the
privilege applied, it was waived by the
defense. The court stated:
Insofar as the [work product] privilege applies to actual testimony in a
criminal trial, defendant waived it
when he called his investigator to
impeach [the government witness]
Boyd's trial testimony and to bolster
the claim that [someone else], not
defendant, was DeSousa's killer.
Having done so, [the defendant]
could not suppress, as privileged,
damaging evidence which was
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within the scope of his direct exami·
nation. (citations omitted). He could
not use the privilege to preserve a
false aura of veracity for his investi·
gators testimony. 44 Cal. 3d at 743.

Cal. Rptr. 682, the plaintiff, an oil exploration company, sued BP Alaska on numerous theories arising from BP Alaska's allegedly unauthorized use of confidential
oil exploration data furnished to it by
plaintiffina three-party arrangement that

In Kerns Constr. Cu. u. Superiur

excluueu the plaintiff. During discovery,

Court,(1968) 266 Cal. App. 2d 405,411, 72
CaL Rptr. 74, the defendant's employee
prepared investigation and accident reports for the defendant concerning the
accident. The employee had the reports
in his possession at the time of his deposition and referred to them in order to
answer questions indicating that he was
otherwise unable to respond. Following
the deposition, an opposing party,
moved for inspection of the documents,
but the trial court refused to order disclosure. The appellate court directed the
trial court to compel production on the
ground that by allowing the employee to
use the documents to refresh his memory
at the deposition, counsel for the defendant employer had waived the work
product protection for the documents.
The court stated:

plaintiff sought documents prepared by
or at the direction of BP Alaska's attorneys. Although plaintiff conceded that
this material constituted opinion work
product, plaintiff argued that it was not
entitled to work product protection because the material was obtained in furtherance of a fraudulent misrepresentation to plaintiff by BP Alaska. Plaintiff
based this argument on Evidence Code
section 956, which creates an exception to
the attorney-client privilege when the legal services were sought or obtained to
enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to
commit a crime or fraud. The trial court
granted the motion to compel, holding
that the plaintiff had established a prima
facie case of fraud. The appellate court
disagreed, holding that the absolute protection for opinion work product is not
subject to the crime-fraud exception applicable to the attorney-client privilege. The
court stated:

Having no independent memory
from which [the witness] could answer the questions; having had the
papers and documents produced by
Gas Co:s attorney for the benefit
and use of the witness; having used
them to give the testimony [that the
witness] did give, it would be unconscionable to prevent the adverse
party from seeing and obtaining
copies of them. We conclude there
was a waiver of any privilege which
may have existed.
If, as claimed, the reports were privileged under the work product rule, the
privilege rested with the attorney and
was waived by the attorney when he
[shel produced the reports to the witness
upon which to premise his testimony.
The attorney cannot reveal his work
product, allow a witness to testify therefrom and then claim work product privilege to prevent the opposing party from
viewing the document from which he
testified.
L. lbe "'fraud" exception to the attorneyclient privilege does not apply to Opinion
work product

In BP Alaska Exp/orations, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1988) 199 CaL App. 3d 1240,245
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[Tlhe absence of a statutory crimefraud exception to the work prod uct
rule implies that the exception does
not apply to work product documents. In addition, the language of
[Code of Civil Procedure section
20l8(C)1 is absolute.
M. Work Product protection continues
even after the case is over

In Fellows v. Superior Court,(1980) 108
Cal. App. 3d 55, 62, 166Cal. Rptr. 274, the
court held that the privilege should not
be held to terminate simply because the
litigation or matter in which the
attorney's work product was created has
come to an end.
The court mentioned the policy behind
the creation of the attorney's work product privilege in support of their holding,
describing the policy as two-fold:
Nondisclosure of his work product is
deemed desirable (1) to encourage
the attorney to make a thorough
preparation for trial, including the
analysis of unfavorable aspects of his
case, as well as the favorable aspects,
and (2) to prevent one attorney from

taking undue advantage of another's
industry and efforts . (citations omitted) 108 CaI.App.3d at 63.
In Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones ZI.
Superior Court (1980) 107 Cal. App. 3d
196,502,165 CaL Rptr. 748, the plaintiff
sued a law firm and its former client for
malicious prosecution and sought information from the law firm's inter-office
memoranda concerning the prior case.
The court held the work product protection afforded these documents did not
end when the case terminated. Reasoning that the primary purpose of the
rule---encouraging full and fair representation of a client and being able to
prepare a case without fear of subsequent scrutiny by opposing partieswas not sufficiently served by a privilege
that lived only until termination of the
action, the court stated:
The instant case illustrates the force
behind such reasoning and we
therefore hold that the privilege extends beyond the termination of the
litigation for which the documents
were prepared.
N. Laying Foundation to Establish
existence of Work Product Privilege

To make a prima facie showing that
the absolute work product privilege is
applicable, a person claiming the work
product protection must establish the
following preliminary facts: (1) that a client sought the attorney's legal counsel,
(2) that the matter sought to be protected
is derived from the attorney's initiative
in the course of providing legal counsel,
(3) that the matter sought to be protected
reflects the attorney's impressions, conclusions, opinions, legal research, or legal theories, and (4) that the matter
sought to be protected is in writing.
Williamson v. Superior Court of Los Angeles,(1978) 21 Cal. 3d 829,834,148 Cal.
Rptr. 39, 582 P.2d 126; Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co. v. Superior Court ,(1984) 153
Cal. App. 3d 467, 478, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471;
Merritt v. Superior Court,(1970) 9 Cal.
App. 3d 721, 731, 88 Cal. Rptr. 337; see
Mize v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.,(1975)
46 CaL App. 3d 436,447,120 CaL Rptr.
787 (party claiming protection must allege preliminary facts showing existence
of work product).
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